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Terrorism—A Brief Explanation 




Executive Summary  
 
This information paper presents a simplified explanation of terrorism. The paper uses 
three methods to convey a basic understanding of terrorism. The paper first explains 
“victim-target differentiation,” the primary method of operation used in terrorist attacks. 
Victim-target differentiation (the strategy of attacking people or property in order to get 
other people to take some kind of action) is a concept that is not always clearly 
understood, and is essential to the comprehension of terrorism. The use of victim-target 
differentiation makes terrorism more complex than most forms of political violence, and 
more difficult to counter. Second, the paper explains terrorism by following and 
analyzing the steps of the terrorist attack. Analyzing each step shows how terrorism 
operates, and establishes the basis for counterterrorism efforts. The paper uses the 
Turner-Yamamoto Terrorism Model to illustrate the steps of the terrorist attack and show 
how terrorism is intended to operate. The model can also serve as a guide to 
comprehending terrorism and how to combat it. The model can be used to identify ways 
to prevent terrorist attacks, respond effectively if they occur, and reduce the use of 
terrorism. 
 
The paper then uses the analysis of the terrorist attack as a way to evaluate specific 
incidents to determine whether or not they are acts of terrorism. Using specific examples 
can help put the characteristics of terrorism into perspective, and can help individuals be 
better prepared to combat terrorism more effectively. This info paper was developed from 
the CISSM monograph, Terrorism Against Democracy, 2015. The monograph is based in 
part on Admiral Stansfield Turner’s course, “Terrorism & Democracy,” which he taught 















Introduction. How can we comprehend terrorism? Can we tell if an incident is an act of 
terrorism? Is terrorism really difficult to understand, or is there no better way than, “I know it 
when I see it”? There are a number of approaches that can be used to help understand terrorism. 
One is to see how terrorism operates as compared to other forms of violence, a second is to 
follow the steps of the terrorist attack, and a third is to look at specific incidents and evaluate 
whether or not they are acts of terrorism. 
 
I. Victim-Target Differentiation: A Key to Terrorism 
 
An important key to comprehending terrorism is to look at the differences between terrorism 
and other forms of violence. The most distinctive difference is in how terrorism “operates.” In 
most forms of violence, the attacker uses violence against someone or something (the “targets of 
violence”) to directly pursue a goal. A military attack is one example; a mugging can be another. 
The direct use of violence can be shown in the steps below: 
 
But terrorism is different. Terrorism does not use a direct strategy, but instead uses the 
indirect strategy of victim-target differentiation. In victim-target differentiation, an attacker uses 
violence against people or property in order to get other people to take some kind of action. In 
other words, the attacker uses violence against one set of targets—the victims or property 
attacked—as a means to get other targets—third-party targets such as groups, governments, 
organizations, and individuals—to take actions that will advance the attacker’s goal. The extra 
step of victim-target differentiation can be shown as in Fig. 1–2, which compares a direct 
violence strategy with the indirect strategy involved in victim-target differentiation. 
 
 
Fig. 1–2. The Direct Use of Violence Compared to Victim-Target Differentiation 
 
1. Direct Strategy:          X                                            X                                                            X                
                                     Attacker           Uses                Targets                                           To achieve the 
                                                           violence          of violence                                         attacker’s goal  
                                                            against            
                                                                                                                                                                  
2. Victim-Target             X                                            X                                                            X  
  Differentiation:        Attacker           Uses                Targets                                                 Attacker’s 
(Indirect Strategy)                           violence          of violence                                                goal 
                                                            against             (victims)                     X                                                                                  
                                                                                                  To affect third-party targets,  
                                                                                                     who are intended to take 
                                                                                                     actions that advance the 
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Fig. 1–1. Steps in the Direct Use of Violence 
 
Direct Strategy:    1. Attacker                 2. Uses violence                    3. Targets                   4. for a goal 
                                                                        against                           of violence 
                                                                                      
 





To illustrate, in a military strike, the attackers try to achieve or advance their goal directly 
through the use of military force. In contrast, a strategy that uses victim-target differentiation 
operates through third-party responses to violence. The purpose of attacking the victims is for the 
effect the attack has on third-parties, so that they will take actions that will advance the attacker’s 
goal. The victims are being used as a means to elicit responses from these third-party targets.  
Victim-target differentiation can be shown in a model. Fig. 1–3 shows that in victim-target 
differentiation, an attacker uses or threatens violence against one set of targets (the people or 
property attacked) to affect third-parties and elicit responses from them to advance a goal. Fig. 
















Victim-Target Differentiation and Forms of Violence. Victim-target differentiation can be 
seen by comparing forms of violence. Four examples are common crime, state terror, terrorism, 
and a military strike. 
Some common crimes can involve victim-target differentiation. For example, if an organized 
crime group damages one shop as a warning to other shopkeepers to pay “protection money,” 
this action involves victim-target differentiation (Fig. 1–5). The violence is aimed at third-parties 
(other shop owners) and is intended to elicit responses from them. But most common crimes do 
































Fig. 1–5. Organized Crime Group Attack to 
Intimidate Shop Owners 
 










6. and elicit 





















Fig. 1–4. Victim-Target Differentiation: 




















State terror can use victim-target 
differentiation (Fig. 1–7).1 In state terror, the 
government generally perpetrates violence 
using state actors and official institutions 
such as the police and judiciary, and the 
violence can be aimed at third-parties. 
During Stalin’s Great Terror, the Soviet 
government used such means as extra-
judicial killings by the police, rigged show 
trials, and deportations to gulags to frighten 
the general population, and thereby suppress 
opposition to the government and coerce 
compliance. 
 
Terrorism always uses victim-target differentiation. A terrorist attack can be described as 
below, and illustrated as in Fig. 1–8: 
 
In a terrorist attack: a nonstate attacker uses violence and the threat of violence 
against noncombatants/property to affect third-parties, and elicit responses from 



















                                                 
1 State terror can be described as the violence that governments use to intimidate, subjugate, and control their 
own populations (or the populations of occupied countries or territories), and suppress opposition and 
resistance. 
2 In general, “noncombatants” are civilians and certain categories of military personnel. The most precise term 
for the “targets of violence” is “noncombatant targets”; however, the Turner-Yamamoto Terrorism Model uses 
“noncombatants/property” to be more easily understood. The Turner-Yamamoto Terrorism Model includes 
clandestine state agents as nonstate actors, since these agents are not usually an openly acknowledged part of a 
government. The Turner-Yamamoto Terrorism Model was developed in conjunction with Stansfield Turner’s 
“Terrorism & Democracy” course at the University of Maryland School of Public Policy. 






































The Turner-Yamamoto Terrorism Model 
To clarify: In a terrorist attack: 
 
1. The attack was done by a nonstate 
actor—that is, a private individual or group, 
or a clandestine state agent—not a person or 
group officially acting for a government. 
 
2. The attack aimed or threatened physical 
violence at noncombatant targets—that is, 
civilians (in general), military personnel in 
noncombatant status, or property. 
 
3. The attack was intended to elicit responses 
from third-party targets—that is, people, 
governments, groups, and organizations 
other than the victims/property attacked.  
 
4. The attack had a political purpose—that 
is, the attack was intended to advance a 
political goal. 





A military strike does not use victim-target differentiation as the primary strategy. Fig. 1–9 
shows the absence of victim-target differentiation in a military strike: the attackers use military  
force directly against targets for a political goal. The 
attackers are using a direct strategy. 
In review, the use or nonuse of victim-target 
differentiation in common crime, a military strike, state 
terror, and terrorism is below:   
 Common crime: Usually does not use victim-target 
differentiation, but can. 
 Military strike: Does not use victim-target 
differentiation as its primary strategy. (Military force 
in general does not use victim-target differentiation.) 
 State terror: Can use victim-target differentiation. 
 Terrorism: Always uses victim-target differentiation. Victim-target differentiation is the most 
distinctive characteristic of terrorism, and must be present for an incident to be an act of 
terrorism—if there is no victim-target differentiation, the incident is not terrorism but another 
kind of violence. 
 
 
Victim-Target Differentiation: A Rare Strategy. Most 
kinds of violence do not use the strategy of victim-target 
differentiation. For example, such forms of violent crime as 
assault and armed robbery do not generally use victim-
target differentiation. Forms of political violence such as 
war, insurrection, and ethnic conflict do not use victim-
target differentiation as the primary strategy.3 Of the forms 
of political violence shown in Fig. 1–10, only terrorism 
always uses victim-target differentiation.4 
Why is victim-target differentiation a relatively rare strategy? One reason is that victim-target 
differentiation is difficult to use “effectively,” because the results depend on what other people 
do in response to the use of violence against the victims. The attacker is not trying to achieve the 
desired result himself through the use of violence, but is trying to get third-parties to help him 
achieve his goal, and cannot control what third-parties do in response to attacks. The attacker can 
only try to coerce or induce third-parties to do what he wants.  
Other reasons are that the strategy of victim-target differentiation can be time-consuming, 
risky, and hard to manage, and many people pursuing a goal through violence would rather seize 
their objective directly through such means as military attack or armed robbery. To use armed 
robbery as an example, it can be more “efficient” to rob a person directly than to take a hostage 
for ransom—it can be quicker and involve less risk to just take the money and go. 
 
Summary. In summary, victim-target differentiation can be somewhat difficult to 
comprehend, but once understood, many aspects of terrorism become clearer.  
 
                                                 
3 Political violence is a large category that includes such actions as war, civil war, military strikes, insurrection, 
ethnic conflict, genocide, state terror, and terrorism. All forms of political violence are methods of struggle that 
can be used alone or with other methods to pursue political goals. 
4 Note that state terror has often used victim-target differentiation. 
 







































II. The Steps of Terrorist Attack. 
 
A second way to comprehend terrorism is to look at the model of the terrorist attack, and 
examine the steps involved. Each step of the terrorist attack involves certain characteristics, and 
analyzing these characteristics can help clarify terrorism. 
The purpose of terrorism is to advance a political 
goal, and the strategy of terrorism is to attack people 
and property in order to “get” third-parties to respond in 
ways that will contribute to that goal. By victimizing 
people and property, terrorists can be trying to coerce, 
intimidate, inspire, influence, and provoke 
governments, groups, organizations, the public, the 
media, supporters, and opponents so that these third-
party targets will choose to take the actions that 
terrorists intend. This intent to trick or induce people 
into helping terrorists pursue their goals is a strategy 
that must be seen clearly to be combated effectively.  
Following the steps of a terrorist attack can increase comprehension of terrorism. These steps 
are outlined in the following description of terrorism: 
 
In a terrorist attack: a nonstate attacker uses violence and the threat of violence 
against noncombatants/property to affect third-parties, and elicit responses from 
them to advance political goals. 
 
The Attacker. In a terrorist attack, the attacker is a nonstate actor; that is, a private group or 
individual, or a clandestine state agent.5 “Nonstate” generally means that the individuals and 
groups are nongovernmental—they are acting on their own 
as private individuals and groups, and are not officially 
acting for a government.6 Nonstate actors are not official 
state actors such as government leaders or soldiers in the 
armed forces of a country. To compare nonstate actors with 
state actors, soldiers in a military unit controlled by a 
government are state actors—an example would be 
American soldiers in the Normandy invasion. In contrast, 
most people are likely to be nonstate actors.  
In the context of terrorism, nonstate actors can include 
clandestine state agents because they are not an official 
part of a government. Clandestine state agents may be an actual part of a government, but are not 
openly acknowledged in the way that employees in most government offices are. The 
government is trying to disguise its actions through the use of these agents, and when they 
perpetrate an attack, it is not usually known that a government directed the attack. Libya, for 
example, used clandestine state agents to bomb Pan Am Flight 103, an act that was widely 
considered to be a terrorist attack.  
 
                                                 
5 Most attackers have been part of a group, such as al Qaeda, but sometimes have operated alone. Eric 
Rudolph, who bombed the 1996 Olympics in Atlanta and perpetrated other attacks, was not part of a group.  
6 Similar terms for “nonstate” can include “subnational,” “substate,” and “nongovernmental.” 




































The Turner-Yamamoto Terrorism Model





In many attacks it is clear whether or not the attacker is a nonstate individual or group. The 
9/11 hijackers were private individuals—nonstate actors. The 2013 Boston Marathon bombers 
were nonstate actors. 
If other than nonstate actors perpetrate an attack, the act is not terrorism but another kind of 
violence. For example, if a government uses violence against its own people to suppress 
resistance, such as Stalin’s Great Terror, that is “state terror.” If a soldier in war deliberately 
attacks civilians (noncombatants), that is a war crime.7 
Violence. A terrorist attack involves violence—the use of violence, and the threat of violence.8 
Many terrorist attacks use actual violence, such as setting off a bomb that damages a building. 
But terrorism also involves the threat of violence, and 
terrorists have used this threat in different ways. Terrorists 
have threatened violence without actually using it, such as 
by a bomb threat. Another way is by using violence, and 
then openly threatening more violence—an example would 
be bombing a building, and then issuing a statement 
threatening to attack another one. Sometimes the threat of 
more violence is unspoken—a terrorist bombs a building, 
and though he doesn’t say anything about another bombing, 
people know (or fear) that there might be another one.  
The threat of future violence is a very important part of the terrorist attack. Terrorist attacks 
contain an inherent threat of further attacks: the attacker is openly (or silently) saying, “Give me 
what I want or I will attack again.” The threat of future violence is particularly important because 
the threat of more attacks can have a greater impact on third-parties than an actual attack itself.  
Terrorist violence has a number of characteristics, such as violence that is illegal, random, 
symbolic, and deliberate. To illustrate, terrorist attacks involve acts such as murder and arson, 
acts that are illegal in nearly all countries. Many terrorist attacks involve random violence, such 
as the effects from a bomb. Terrorists often attack targets that are symbolic, such as a national 
monument. Terrorist violence is deliberate—an accident is not a terrorist attack. This matters 
because sometimes there have been deliberate attempts to label accidents as terrorist attacks—for 
example, it can be politically advantageous to call an incident a terrorist attack to try to discredit 
a certain community. These and other characteristics of terrorist violence can increase the impact 
of terrorist attacks. To illustrate, attacks on children can arouse intense feelings in third-parties. 
 
                                                 
7 Note that if a government provides resources or direction to a terrorist group, that is “state-sponsored 
terrorism” or “state-supported terrorism.” States can be involved in nonstate terrorism in a number of ways, and 
to varying degrees, such as through tolerance or active support, but the actual attackers are still nonstate actors. 
Note too that “state-sponsored terrorism” is a type of nonstate terrorism, in the same way that “international 
terrorism” is a type of nonstate terrorism. These “subsets” of terrorism can pose different threats, operate in 
different ways, and require different methods and tools to combat. 
8 The difference between “violence” and “force” is significant in terms of terrorism. Force can be described as 
the use of physical power to overcome, restrain, or physically coerce, and violence as the use of that same 
physical power to injure, damage, or abuse. Violence involves the intent to injure or damage, whereas force 
may or may not be intended to injure. A policeman applying handcuffs is using force, not violence, to 
physically restrain a person—the handcuffs are not intended to injure. One reason the distinction between force 
and violence is relevant to terrorism is because of the legal aspects. Force, even lethal force, is lawful when 
properly used by authorized individuals such as police officers and soldiers (soldiers use military force). In 
contrast, the use of violence by nonstate actors is not lawful except in particular circumstances such as self-
defense from attempted murder. 























The Targets of Violence: Noncombatants and Property. A terrorist attack threatens, injures, 
or kills noncombatants, and threatens, damages, and destroys property. In the context of 
terrorism, the term “noncombatant” generally refers to two groups of people: civilians, and 
military personnel in noncombatant status.  
Civilians are generally all persons who are not 
members of the armed forces of a country; however, 
in some circumstances civilians may not be 
noncombatants. For example, during war and armed 
conflicts, civilians who take a direct part in hostilities, 
such as by taking up arms, are no longer 
noncombatants.9 
Military personnel in noncombatant status include 
military personnel who do not engage in combat such 
as medics and chaplains, or who cannot engage in 
combat because they are wounded, ill,  
captured, or shipwrecked. Military personnel 
who are outside of a war zone or warlike setting 
(whether or not armed or on duty), or not in 
combatant status at the time of an incident, may 
be considered noncombatants. The U.S. 
government considered the sailors on the USS 
Cole to be noncombatants when the ship was 
attacked by suicide bombers in 2000. The 
situation was peaceful—the ship was refueling 
when a boat blew a large hole in the side of the 
ship, killing and injuring many U.S. sailors.  
It is important to note, however, that those 
who may be considered noncombatants can be  
subject to some interpretation, particularly during wartime. But in general, and particularly during 
peacetime, “noncombatant” means civilians and certain categories of military personnel.  
Property as the target of violence. Many terrorist attacks have targeted people and property, 
but other attacks have targeted only property. An example of an attack that targeted only 
property was the 1998 Vail ski resort attack. In that attack, the Earth Liberation Front (ELF) 
destroyed several structures to try to prevent the expansion of a ski resort in Vail, Colorado, but 
did not harm any people physically. Note, though, that attacks that damage only property operate 
in the same way as attacks on people (and even when only property is attacked, there is always 
an implicit threat that future violence may not be confined to property). 
 
                                                 
9 The actions considered to be taking a “direct part in hostilities” during war may be subject to some 
interpretation. For example, during war, civilians providing command, administrative, or logistics support to 
military operations can be subject to attack while so engaged. However, in peacetime—during which the 
majority of terrorist attacks generally take place—most civilians are noncombatants. In addition, during any 
armed struggle, the intentional targeting of noncombatants is prohibited—a prohibition that terrorists 
frequently violate. Terrorists have claimed to be “at war” and therefore their attacks on civilians are justified, 
but this claim is false—terrorism is not “war.” See, for example, U.S. Army, FM 27-10, The Law of Land 
Warfare, 1956, and U.S. Navy, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, 1987. 


















The USS Cole, 2000 





Phase I: The Violent Attack. The first three steps of a terrorist attack—the attacker, the 
violence used, and the targets of violence (the victims)—form Phase I of a terrorist attack, as 
















Phase II: The Involvement of Third-Parties. The next steps in a terrorist attack involve the 
true targets of the attack—that is, third-parties. These steps form Phase II of a terrorist attack: 
how third-parties are affected by the violence perpetrated on the victims, and how this violence is 
intended to elicit responses from third-parties. The key elements in Phase II are below:  
 the effect the attack has on third-parties,  
 how they respond to the attack,  
 the “mechanisms” used to elicit these responses, and  
 how these responses advance (or retard) progress toward the attackers’ goals.  
 
Phase II of a terrorist attack can be shown as in Fig. 1–16. Analysis of each element follows, 
beginning with the third-party targets, who are the key to Phase II—as can be seen in Fig. 1–17, 












































Fig. 1–17. Terrorism: 






















Third-Party Targets. Third-party targets are the 
governments, organizations, groups, and individuals 
that the attackers are trying to get to take certain 
actions in response to the use of violence against the 
victims. Third-party targets can include 
governments, organizations, members of the general 
public, companies, ethnic groups (or any kind of 
group), religious communities, and the media. Other 
third-parties may be rivals, diasporas, and the 
“constituent community” (the group that the 
terrorists claim to represent). 
Third-party targets can be described in different ways, such as whether or not third-parties 
support or oppose the attackers’ political goal. In this area, third-party targets can be categorized 
in a range including “supporters,” “potential supporters,” “neutrals,” “potential opponents,” and 
“opponents,” as shown below:  
 
 
Fig. 1–19. The Range of Third-Party Targets 
 
 
     ------ Supporters  -------------   Neutrals  --------------  Opponents ------- 
 
----------|-----------------|-----------------------|---------------------|----------------|---------- 
        Supporters       Potential            Uncommitted/         Potential       Opponents 
                               Supporters           Unconcerned         Opponents 
 
 
The media is in a special category because 
it is involved in a terrorist attack in two ways: 
the media is the primary means by which 
most people hear about an attack, but is also 
an important third-party target (Fig. 1–20). 
Terrorists aim at the media as a third-party 
target because how members of the media 
present news about attacks can affect how 
other third-parties view the terrorists and 
their goals. Therefore terrorists have made 
strong efforts to influence, intimidate, and 
even coerce members of the media. To 
illustrate, terrorists have tried to influence the 
media into presenting the terrorists’ goals 
sympathetically, and project how the terrorists want to be seen, such as Robin Hood battling for 
the oppressed. However, terrorists may also try to intimidate members of the media seen as 
“unfriendly.”10 
A terrorist attack is usually aimed at a primary third-party target, such as a government or a 
particular community, but in almost all attacks, terrorists are aiming at a number of third-party 
targets at the same time. For example, regardless of what group or government is the primary 
third-party target, terrorists almost always aim at the public, media, and supporters as well.  
 
                                                 
10 Terrorists have murdered many journalists. 





← Supporters ↔ Neutrals ↔ Opponents →
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Eliciting Responses. There are several steps in the process of trying to elicit the intended 
responses from third-parties. A five-step process follows. 
In Step 1, third-parties find out about an 
attack, usually through the media, but also 
through other ways such as by being on the 
scene or by word of mouth. (But note that if 
potential third-party targets do not find out 
about an attack, the process of eliciting 
responses stops—the terrorist attack does not 
affect third-party targets, or elicit any 
responses.) 
In Step 2, finding out about the attack has 
an effect on people and arouses emotions of 
some kind in many third-parties. These 
emotions can be wide-ranging and can include 
such emotions as shock, fear, confusion, 
outrage, anger, rage, vengefulness, interest, 
and glee. Different third-parties are likely to 
feel different emotions, and to varying degrees 
of intensity. Many third-party targets can be 
shocked and enraged by an attack, but other 
third-party targets, such as terrorist supporters, 
may be elated by the same attack.  
In Step 3, the emotions aroused by the 
attack cause third-parties to feel impulses 
regarding how to respond. These impulses can 
vary based on how third-parties view the 
attack, the terrorist group, and the political 
goal being pursued. Gleeful supporters may  
feel the impulse to go out on the streets and fire weapons in the air to show support for the 
terrorists, their cause, or both. Enraged opponents may also feel the impulse to go out on the 
streets and fire weapons—but at members of the community they think the terrorists belong to. 
In Step 4, third-parties decide how they will respond to the attack—what they will actually do 
(if anything). Individuals, groups, organizations, and governments may make these decisions 
hastily and emotionally, or after careful deliberation. (Terrorists are often trying to elicit hasty 
and emotional responses.) 
In Step 5, third-parties actually do take action (or no action at all as their response). This is a 
crucial step in a terrorist attack. People cannot always control how they feel after an attack, or 
their impulses regarding how to respond, but they can control what they do. Some responses 
fight terrorism effectively, but other responses strengthen terrorists and move them closer to 
achieving their goals—and these are the responses that terrorists are trying to elicit. 
Note that terrorists cannot force responses. Terrorists can only set up conditions intended to 
elicit desired responses—to try to set the desired train of events in motion, and then manipulate 
third-party responses toward a political goal.  









































“Mechanisms” to elicit responses. To try to elicit the desired responses from different third-
party targets, terrorists use a number of “mechanisms,” such as to coerce, intimidate, provoke, 
inspire, stimulate, and influence third-parties. Some mechanisms involve pressure, such as 
attempts to coerce and intimidate third-parties, whereas other mechanisms are intended to elicit 
more voluntary responses, such as actions that are inspired by attacks. For example, through 
attacks, terrorists may be trying to elicit the following emotions and responses from third-parties: 
— Inspire enthusiasm in supporters so 
that they will increase their donations 
and volunteer to join the group; 
— Stimulate interest in the general public 
so that people will try to find out more 
about the group’s goals, look 
sympathetically on these goals, and 
then translate that sympathy into 
political support; 
— Influence the media to focus on the 
terrorists’ goals rather than on the 
atrocities perpetrated on the victims; 
— Coerce a government into granting 
concessions; and  
— Provoke rage in a particular community so that members will take actions that drag that 
community closer to the terrorists’ moral level. 
 
 
These kinds of responses can bring terrorists closer to their goals through such means as 
increasing their political support, strengthening them with resources, and weakening their 
opponents. Terrorists intend for the entire range of their third-party targets to respond with 
actions that advance the group’s goals, but any “gain” helps them, as can be seen in Fig. 1–24. 
 
 
Fig. 1–24. Selected Emotions and Responses That Terrorists Seek to Elicit 
                 
         --------|-----------------------|--------------------|---------------------|-----------------|--------- 
                Supporters              Potential          Uncommitted/        Potential       Opponents 
                                              Supporters         Unconcerned       Opponents   
 
             Satisfaction;              Desire to          Interest; Fear;         Shock; Horror; Anxiety; Fear; 
      Glee; Greater fervor    support or join        Sympathy           Anger; Outrage; Vengefulness 
 
        More donations;         Become active      Choose sides;             Overreact; Retaliate in kind; 
           New Recruits           supporters        Give political support       Give in to demands 
 
Contribute to Advancing a Political Goal 
 
  
Terrorists also try to advance their goals by manipulating third-party responses, and the 
interplay among these responses, and thus mobilize and channel third-party actions. Terrorists 
intend for the combined and cumulative effect of third-party responses to advance a political 
goal. 





Supporters ↔ Neutrals ↔ Opponents
&



















A Political Goal. To be a terrorist attack, an incident must have a political goal. “Political” 
can be described as “concerned with government, the State, or politics,” and terrorism has been 
used in the pursuit of many political goals. Some goals have been national liberation, replacing a  
government, repressing a specific group, and changing 
particular policies within a government (often single issues 
such as the environment).  
The scope of these goals has varied widely. Some groups 
have sought goals as large as completely changing the 
political systems of many countries. Marxist groups in the 
1960s, 1970s, and 1980s used terrorist attacks to try to change 
the political systems in the United States, Western Europe, 
and elsewhere to a communist model. In the 1990s and into 
the 21st century, the terrorist group al Qaeda sought to replace 
several governments with an Islamic caliphate.  
Other groups have used terrorist attacks to try to change the political system in one country. 
Some groups in the Middle East and Africa used terrorist attacks to try to change the political 
systems in their countries to their interpretation of an Islamic model. (Note that groups may state 
their goals in religious terms, but their goal is political: to replace a regime with their own 
preferred form of government.) 
Some groups have used terrorist attacks to try to change specific policies. Terrorist attacks on 
behalf of the environment and animal rights are examples. Groups pursuing these goals did not 
seek to overthrow a government, but only for certain policies to be changed.  
Some terrorist attacks have been intended to prevent political change. Many terrorist attacks 
against the U.S. civil rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s were intended to preserve the 
existing political system—one goal was to intimidate African-Americans so that they would stop 
trying to get discriminatory policies and laws changed. 
Groups may or may not think that they will achieve their goals through the use of terrorism, 
but they do think that that its use will advance those goals. In the 1970s and 1980s, Puerto Rican 
terrorists did not believe that their bombing campaigns in the United States would result in 
Puerto Rican independence, but rather that the attacks would draw attention to their cause.11  
A group that uses terrorism has an overall political goal or cause, and terrorist attacks have 
specific objectives intended to contribute to that goal. For example, a particular attack may be 
intended to obtain the release of jailed terrorists, halt a peace process, or provoke repressive 
measures that will alienate a particular part of the population. The objectives being pursued in 
each specific terrorist attack need to be seen in the context of how each attack relates to the 
group’s overall goals.  
 
Summary. This analysis follows the steps of the terrorist attack, and addressed many aspects 
of terrorism. Note that there have been a number of disagreements about terrorism; however, 
regardless of any disagreements about particular aspects, the basic strategy that terrorism follows 





                                                 
11 FBI, Terrorism in the United States 1999, 19.  






















III. Incident Analysis. 
 
A third way to comprehend terrorism is to look at specific incidents and evaluate whether or 
not they are acts of terrorism. To be a terrorist attack, an act must meet certain criteria. Some 
criteria are mandatory; others have more flexibility.12 Table 1–1 lists the required conditions for 
an incident to be an act of terrorism, with the conditions restated as questions.  










1. The attack was done by a nonstate actor—that is, a 
private individual or group, or a clandestine state agent—
not a person or group officially acting for a government. 
 
2. The attack aimed or threatened physical violence at 
noncombatant targets—that is, civilians (in general), 
military personnel in noncombatant status, or property. 
 
3. The attack was intended to elicit responses from third-
party targets—that is, people, governments, organizations, 
and groups other than the victims/property attacked. 
 
 
4. The attack had a political purpose—that is, the attack 





Required Conditions as Questions: 
 




2. Was the violence aimed at 
physically harming or threatening 
noncombatant targets?  
 
3. Was the attack intended to elicit 









From the required conditions for an incident to be a terrorist attack, and the conditions 
restated as questions, a table can be developed to aid in evaluating incidents and determine if 
they are acts of terrorism. The answer to each required condition must be “Yes” for the incident 














                                                 
12 See CISSM working paper, Terrorism Against Democracy, 2015, Appendix B, for a detailed analysis of the 
characteristics of terrorism, and the required conditions for an incident to be a terrorist attack. 
 











2. Was the violence aimed at physically 




3. Was the attack intended to elicit responses 








Was the incident a terrorist attack?  
(Were all required conditions met?) 
 
 





The 9/11 Attacks, September 11, 2001. What happened? The FBI described the incident as 
follows: “On the morning of September 11, 2001, four U.S. commercial airliners were hijacked by 
four coordinated teams of terrorists. The 19 hijackers who carried out the operation were affiliated 
with Al-Qaeda, a worldwide terrorist network that had previously 
attacked U.S. military and diplomatic targets. The hijackers used 
knives, boxcutters, and possibly pepper spray to attack passengers and 
flight crews and to commandeer the aircraft. After taking control of the 
aircraft, the hijackers flew toward preselected targets on the U.S. East 
Coast. Three of the commandeered aircraft reached their destinations, 
destroying the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City 
and badly damaging the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia. The fourth 
aircraft crashed into a remote field in Stony Creek Township, 
Pennsylvania, as passengers attempted to regain control of the 
airplane. All of the passengers on each of the aircraft were killed in the 
attack, as were more than 2,500 people in the twin towers and the 
Pentagon. In total, 2,783 people died in the September 11 attack.”13 
Was this incident a terrorist attack? 
Yes: all of the required conditions to be a 
terrorist attack were met.  
1. The attackers were members of al 
Qaeda, a nonstate group.  
2. The attackers used violence 
(hijacking), and the targets of violence were 
noncombatants and property. The people 
injured and killed in the World Trade Center 
were noncombatants (civilians), as were the 
passengers on all four planes. The military 
personnel injured and killed in the Pentagon 
were noncombatants at the time of the 
attacks—they were unarmed, and it was peacetime. The attacks destroyed a great deal of 
property. 
The attacks involved the threat of violence: though the threat of future attacks was not openly 
stated after the attack, the threat was implicit, and clearly perceived (the US government, for 
example, instituted extensive protective measures, including the mobilization of military forces).  
3. The attack was aimed at a wide range of third-party targets, and was intended to elicit 
responses from many groups, governments, organizations, communities, and individuals. Osama 
bin Laden, the head of Al Qaeda, later said that the responses to the 9/11 attacks had “exceeded 
all expectations.”14  
4. The attack had a political purpose. The attack was intended to advance Al Qaeda’s political 
goals, such as the expulsion of foreign influences from Muslim countries, and the creation of an 
Islamic caliphate.  
 
                                                 
13 FBI, Terrorism 2000/2001, 14–15. (Note that the figure of 2,783 people who died in the September 11 
attacks does not include the 19 hijackers who also died in the attack.) 
14 Osama bin Laden, “Full Transcript of bin Ladin’s Speech,” Oct. 30, 2004, aljazeera.net (July 4, 2005).  
 














2. Was the violence aimed at physically 





3. Was the attack intended to elicit responses 










Was the incident a terrorist attack?  






World Trade Center, 2001 
 





Vail Ski Resort Attack, 1998. What happened? In October 1998, the Earth Liberation Front 
(ELF), a nonstate actor, used arson to destroy a number of buildings and ski structures to try to  
stop the expansion of a ski resort in Vail, Colorado. A court case 
to stop the expansion had been lost and construction was 
scheduled to begin. The attack caused an estimated $12 million in 
damage, but no people were physically harmed. In an email sent 
to local universities, newspapers, and radio stations, ELF warned 
skiers to choose other destinations until the resort stopped its 
expansion efforts, and threatened further action: “This action is 
just a warning. We will be back if this greedy corporation 
continues to trespass into wild and unroaded areas.” 
Was this incident a terrorist attack? Yes: all of the required conditions were met.  
1. The Earth Liberation Front (ELF) was a nonstate group.  
2. ELF used violence (arson), and threatened further violence. 
3. ELF was seeking to affect third-
parties and elicit responses from them. 
Vail Resorts, the company planning the 
expansion, was a primary third-party 
target, but other third-party targets 
included skiers, the public, ski resort 
companies in general, environmental 
supporters, and local townspeople. The 
perpetrators desired to elicit different 
responses from different third-party 
targets, such as to intimidate companies 
into refraining from building more ski 
resorts; frighten potential investors into 
withholding investment funds; galvanize supporters and potential supporters into contributing 
funds; and polarize the local community by increasing dissension between those townspeople 
who opposed expansion, and those who supported it. 
4. The goal was political. The group’s overall cause was the environment, and the specific 
goal was to stop the resort expansion (and thereby protect the lynx habitat in Colorado).  
 
Mugging in a Dark Alley (common crime—not a 
form of political violence). Is a mugging a terrorist 
attack? No: an “ordinary” mugging does not meet 
all of the required conditions to be a terrorist attack. 
In a common crime mugging, the attacker is a nonstate 
actor, and uses/threatens violence, but there is no 
victim-target differentiation, and no political goal—the 




















2. Was the violence aimed at physically 





3. Was the attack intended to elicit responses 










Was the incident a terrorist attack?  







Vail Ski Resort Attack, 1998 
 



















Military Attack: The Battle of Gettysburg, 1863. The military attacks in the Battle of 
Gettysburg were not acts of terrorism. The attackers were state actors (soldiers) who used 
military force against other armed combatants, and not against noncombatants (military property 
such as artillery pieces were also targeted). 
There was no victim-target differentiation—the primary intent of the military force was not to 
elicit responses from third-parties. The immediate objectives of the use of force were to seize and 
defend territory (the terrain around the town of Gettysburg), and to render the opposing forces 
incapable of physically seizing, occupying, or defending territory. 
The military force was used to serve a political goal. Both sides used military force in pursuit 
















Table 1–2 compares the 9/11 attacks, the 1998 Vail ski resort attack, the act of “mugging” (to 
show the difference between terrorism and common crime), and the Battle of Gettysburg. Of the 
four examples, the 9/11 attacks and the Vail ski resort attack were acts of terrorism. 
 
 




Required Conditions to Be a Terrorist 
Attack 

































2. Was the violence aimed at physically 











3. Was the attack intended to elicit responses 






















Was the incident a terrorist attack?  



























2. Was the violence aimed at physically 





3. Was the attack intended to elicit responses 










Was the battle a terrorist attack?  

















MILITARY FORCE A 
(State Actors)








A terrorist attack is an attack in which a nonstate actor uses violence and the threat of 
violence against noncombatant targets for the effect on third-parties, in order to get responses 
that will aid the attackers’ political goal. Terrorism “operates” differently from most forms of 
violence because of the attacker’s intent to involve third-parties through victim-target 
differentiation. Victim-target differentiation makes terrorism more complex than most other 
forms of political violence, more difficult to comprehend, and harder to counter. Terrorism poses 
particular dangers because third-party responses can cause more damage than was done by the 
attack itself. 
By examining the strategy of terrorism, people can comprehend terrorism and how it 
operates, and identify the kinds of actions that terrorists are trying to get third-party targets to 
take. This understanding is essential to avoid falling into terrorist traps, and is a first step toward 
devising and carrying out effective counterterrorism measures. 
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